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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 Rajendrasinh Makwana petitions for review of his final order of removal.  
Makwana, a citizen and native of India, was convicted of computer intrusion in violation 
of federal law. An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) subsequently ordered Makwana removed as 
an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). In affirming the IJ’s ruling that Makwana was convicted of a CIMT, 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) looked beyond Makwana’s statute of 
conviction and impermissibly reviewed his indictment and the facts underlying his 
criminal case. Therefore, we grant Makwana’s petition for review, vacate the BIA’s 
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ruling that he is removable for having been convicted of a CIMT, and remand the case to 
the BIA. 
 
I. 
 Makwana entered the United States in March 2008 as a nonimmigrant worker with 
authorization to remain in the country until March 2010. On December 17, 2010, 
Makwana was convicted after trial in the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland of one count of “computer intrusion” in violation of former 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) and (a)(5)(B)(i) (2002).1   
 While Makwana was serving a term of imprisonment, the Department of 
Homeland Security served Makwana with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) in Immigration 
Court. The NTA charged Makwana as removable on three bases: (1) for overstaying his 
authorized period, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B); (2) for failing to maintain or 
comply with the conditions of the nonimmigrant status under which he was admitted, in 
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i); and (3) for having been convicted of a CIMT, 
committed within five years after his admission, for which a sentence of one year or 
longer may be imposed, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).  
 In his decision order, the IJ sustained all three charges of removability and ordered 
Makwana removed to India. Makwana appealed, and the BIA issued its own decision on 
the merits, which upheld the three charges of removability. In evaluating whether 
Makwana’s conviction for computer intrusion constituted a CIMT, the BIA expressly 
                                              
1 This statute is now codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A) and (c)(4)(A)(i)(I) (2008). 
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referenced Makwana’s indictment, stating that “the respondent’s indictment describes the 
critical role of Fannie Mae, the victim of the respondent’s crime, in providing ‘liquidity 
and stability to the U.S. housing and mortgage markets.’” A.R. 4 (quoting Indictment ¶ 
2). Additionally, the BIA considered the “nature of the affected computer.” A.R. 4. The 
BIA reasoned that, “[g]iven the nature of the affected computer, the crime of computer 
intrusion threatens significant societal harm.” A.R. 4. The BIA concluded that the 
“combination of knowing conduct, specific intent to cause damage, and the adverse 
societal consequences of the intended damage render the respondent’s crime inherently 
base and morally reprehensible. . . . Intentionally causing damage that can have a 
significant societal impact is contrary to the duties we owe one another in society.” A.R. 
4. Based on this reasoning, the BIA upheld the IJ’s finding that Makwana was removable 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). 
 Makwana filed a petition for review. He concedes that he is removable on the two 
non-criminal charges, and he challenges only the BIA’s finding that he is removable for 
having been convicted of a CIMT.2 
II. 
As a threshold matter, the Government argues that we should deny the petition for 
review and uphold the removal order based on the BIA’s uncontested findings regarding 
                                              
2 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a) and (b)(2). Where, as in this case, 
“the BIA issues its own decision on the merits, rather than a summary affirmance, we 
review its decision, not that of the IJ.” Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 
2012) (citation omitted). Where, as here, the BIA is interpreting federal criminal laws, we 
review the agency’s decision de novo. Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 88 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(citation omitted).  
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Makwana’s non-criminal grounds of removability. Contrary to the Government’s 
argument, it is necessary to review the BIA’s ruling that Makwana was convicted of a 
CIMT. This ruling triggers a permanent bar to readmission, see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), whereas the BIA’s uncontested findings regarding Makwana’s non-
criminal grounds of removability do not render Makwana permanently inadmissible.   
III. 
We apply the categorical approach to determine whether an individual’s 
conviction constitutes a CIMT. Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 465 (3d Cir. 
2009). The categorical approach requires courts to “compare the elements of the statute 
forming the basis of the defendant’s conviction with the elements of the ‘generic’ 
crime—i.e., the offense as commonly understood.” Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 
2276, 2281 (2013).   
Under limited circumstances, courts are permitted to apply a variant of the 
categorical approach known as the “modified categorical approach.” The modified 
categorical approach allows courts to look beyond the statutory elements and consult the 
record of conviction when the underlying criminal statute “renders opaque which element 
played a part in the defendant’s conviction.” Id. at 2283. The record of conviction 
“includes the indictment, plea, verdict, and sentence.” Partyka v. Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 
408, 416 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Courts are authorized to use the modified 
categorical approach only where the relevant conviction was for violating a so-called 
“divisible statute.” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281-82.  
A divisible statute is a statute that sets forth one or more elements of the crime in 
6 
 
the alternative. Id. at 2281. Conversely, a statute is indivisible if it does not contain 
alternative elements. Id. This Court has held that, for purposes of considering whether a 
conviction is for a CIMT, a statute of conviction is “divisible” when it defines “variations 
of the same offense, some of which would constitute a CIMT and others of which would 
not.” Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 474 n.16.  
In the instant case, the BIA decided, without explanation, that Makwana’s statute 
of conviction was divisible and consequently applied the modified categorical approach. 
The relevant statute of conviction reads as follows:  
(a) Whoever . . . (5)(A)(i) knowingly causes the transmission of a program, 
information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, 
intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer 
. . . [and] (B) by conduct described in [(a)(5)(A)(i)] caused (or, in the case 
of an attempted offense, would, if completed, have caused) — (i) loss to 1 
or more persons during any 1-year period (and, for purposes of an 
investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the United States 
only, loss resulting from a related course of conduct affecting 1 or more 
other protected computers) aggregating at least $5,000 in value . . . shall be 
punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section.  
 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) and (a)(5)(B)(i). 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A), the penalty 
provision cited in Makwana’s Judgment of Conviction, allows for a fine and 
imprisonment of up to ten years. Because Makwana’s statute of conviction does not 
contain alternative elements, some of which constitute a CIMT and some of which do 
not, it is clearly indivisible. Accordingly, the BIA erred by applying the modified 
categorical approach instead of the categorical approach.  
Moreover, the BIA erred by relying upon Makwana’s indictment and the facts of 
his criminal case to determine whether his conviction constituted a CIMT. The 
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categorical approach prohibits any inquiry beyond the statute of conviction. See, e.g., 
Rojas v. Att’y Gen., 728 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2013) (“It is . . . a fundamental rule that 
courts applying the categorical approach may not delve into the particular facts of a 
conviction to ascertain if there is a proper fit.”); Borrome v. Att’y Gen., 687 F.3d 150, 159 
(3d Cir. 2012) (rejecting use of indictment to determine whether the conviction was for 
distributing a controlled substance, since the categorical approach applied); Singh v. 
Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 154 (3d Cir. 2004) (rejecting use of factual record to determine 
and use the age of the victim against the alien, since the categorical approach applied).  
Here, the BIA impermissibly reviewed the indictment for information about 
Makwana’s crime victim and the affected computer. For example, the BIA turned to the 
record and stated that “the respondent’s indictment describes the critical role of Fannie 
Mae, the victim of the respondent’s crime.” A.R. 4. The BIA even quoted the indictment 
verbatim, writing that Fannie Mae’s critical role is to provide “liquidity and stability to 
the U.S. housing and mortgage markets.” A.R. 4 (quoting Indictment ¶ 2). By reviewing 
Makwana’s indictment and the facts underlying his conviction, the BIA exceeded the 
boundaries of the categorical approach.  
 Given the agency’s errors, we vacate the BIA’s ruling with respect to Makwana’s 
criminal ground of removability and remand this case to the BIA. On remand, the BIA 
must confine itself to reviewing Makwana’s statute of conviction. In particular, the BIA 
must consider whether “‘the least culpable conduct necessary to sustain a conviction 
under the statute’ can be considered morally turpitudinous.” Mehboob v. Att’y Gen., 549 
F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Partyka, 417 F.3d at 411). As the Supreme Court 
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recently reaffirmed in Moncrieffe v. Holder, the categorical approach demands that courts 
“focus on the minimum conduct criminalized” by the statute of conviction. 133 S. Ct. 
1678, 1684-85 (2013). Because courts must examine what the “conviction necessarily 
involved, not the facts underlying the case,” courts “must presume that the conviction 
‘rested upon [nothing] more than the least of th[e] acts’ criminalized, and then determine 
whether even those acts are encompassed by the generic federal offense.” Id. at 1684 
(alteration in original) (citing Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137 (2010)).    
 In his petition for review, Makwana poses two hypothetical examples that, he 
contends, represent non-turpitudinous conduct that could be criminalized under 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) and (a)(5)(B)(i). The first example involves an employee of a 
financial institution who commits an office prank on two co-workers by entering a code 
into a human resources computer. See Pet’rs Br. at 23. The second example involves an 
employee of a financial institution who deletes personal data about himself and his family 
that he believes his department is wrongfully retaining. See Pet’rs Br. at 24. In both 
instances, the employer must pay $5,000 to detect and fix the damage caused by the 
employee’s conduct. We urge the BIA to consider these hypothetical examples as it 
evaluates whether the least culpable conduct criminalized under Makwana’s statute of 
conviction qualifies as morally turpitudinous conduct.  
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petition for review, vacate the BIA’s 
ruling that Makwana is removable for having been convicted of a CIMT, and remand the 
case to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
